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In a review paper about public sector
performance management research, Pollitt
(2006) warned us 10 years ago that politicians
were the missing link in this field. Although some
studies about politicians’ use of financial and
performance information—or, more generally,
accounting information—have been published,
the problem is still largely under-researched. In
order to promote research in this domain, this
essay has two main aims. First, I present a critical
reflection on recent academic studies in the field.
Second, I suggest some ideas for a challenging
research agenda. The essay ends with some
practical implications.
A critical review of politicians’ use of
accounting information
This section analyses four studies: two about
politicians’ use of financial information; and two
about this group’s use of performance
information. My goal is to understand why the
studies show diverging findings and to see what
we can learn from them for future research.
First, an overview of the research over the past
decade is presented.
Overview of the research
Research on politicians’ use of financial/
performance information and its perceived
usefulness has emerged over the past decade in
international accounting and public
administration journals.
Financial information typically concerns
budgetary issues, such as appropriations and the
expected costs of certain services, or accrual-
based issues, such as the depreciation of fixed
assets and equity relative to debt (van Helden
and Hodges, 2015, chapters 3 and 6). Studies by
Liguori et al. (2012) about Italian aldermen point
to a high appreciation of cash-based budgeting
and accrual-based accounting elements; whereas
Buylen’s (2014) examination of Flemish
councillors indicates a very low use of this
information in budgetary debates. The latter
finding also applies to Hyndman’s (in Ezzamel et
al., 2008) study of the use of accrual-based
budgeting and accounting information among
MPs in the Northern Ireland (NI) Assembly.
Yamamoto’s (2008) investigation of financial
information use in Japanese government shows
different findings depending on the
governmental level; use was very limited at the
central level and there was moderate use at the
local level.
Performance information generally entails
the quantity and quality of government services
and activities, or specific aspects of a
transformation process, such as efficiency (for
example cost per unit of service) and effectiveness
(the outcomes related to the goals). Empirical
studies on performance information appreciation
and use cover a broad spectrum of countries and
levels of government. There is, however, a lack of
consensus in the findings. Low levels of
appreciation and use are found in studies
conducted at the central government level in the
UK (Johnson and Talbot, 2007); at the state level
(Bourdeaux, 2008) and the federal level
(Stalebrink and Frisco, 2011) in the USA; in
Estonia’s central government (Raudla, 2012); in
Dutch municipalities (ter Bogt, 2004); and in
German and Italian local governments (Grossi et
al., 2016). Other studies, however, show opposite,
more ‘positive’ findings, especially Askim (2007)
for Norwegian municipalities; Brun and Siegel
(2006) for the Swiss central and intermediate
governments; Saliterer and Korac (2013) for
municipalities in Austria; and Ho (2006) for local
governments in the USA’s midwest. In addition,
some studies show mixed findings, particularly
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ter Bogt et al. (2015) for intermediate government
in the Netherlands.
So why are the findings so different? Before
answering this question, we need to look at the
contexts that contribute to the usefulness and
use of accounting information. Although there
seems to be little consistency in the above
studies, some pointers can be given: the quality
of the accounting information matters (Ho,
2006; Grossi et al., 2016); the availability of
budgetary powers is an enabler for accounting
information use (Bourdeaux, 2008; Raudla,
2012); and cash information is preferred to
accrual information (Yamamoto, 2008; Liguori
et al., 2012; Buylen, 2014).
Financial information use
Liguori et al. (2012) investigated the extent to
which politicians and managers in Italian local
government appreciated three types of partly
NPM-related accounting elements, i.e. budgetary
cash-based information, accrual information and
non-financial performance information. They
obtained their data from a survey of aldermen.
Buylen (2014; see also Buylen and Christiaens,
2016) studied the same financial information
items among Flemish local government
councillors, based on observations about the
extent to which this type of information was
actually used in municipal councils’ annual
budgetary meetings. A comparison between both
studies reveals astonishing differences (see table
1). Aldermen in Italy highly appreciate budgetary
cash-based accounting information and they
‘approve’ of accrual accounting information. In
Belgium, however, the actual use of these types
of information by Flemish councillors is very low
for budgetary items and almost absent for accrual
items. Why do these differences occur?
The most likely explanation is based on a
combination of two factors: the way in which
usefulness and use are measured; and the type
of data collection method applied. The Italian
study investigates appreciation or usefulness, while
the Flemish study examines use. Moreover, the
Italian study is based on a survey and the Flemish
study on the observation of actual behaviour.
Measuring the usefulness of financial items to
politicians—or, in other words, their
appreciation of them—through a survey
significantly overestimates the actual use of
these items. This has to do with the risk that
surveys can be biased towards desirable
behaviour, which especially applies to more or
less technical concepts. Moreover, appreciation
of a certain type of information does not
automatically lead to its use. To start using an
item, people need to be triggered to do so. This
analysis shows that:
•Politicians’ appreciation or perceived usefulness
of financial items is much higher than their
actual use.
•In comparison with observational studies,
surveys overestimate the potential use of
financial items.
These conclusions were corroborated by a recent
Table 1. Comparison of the appreciation and use financial information by Italian and
Flemish local government politicians.
Research Liguori et al. (2012)* Buylen (2014)
Country Italy Flanders (Belgium)
Respondents Aldermen Councillors
Method Appreciation of items Observation of actual
through a survey use
Measurement Importance of financial Frequency in number of
 items (5 point scale: 122 budgetary debates
1 = very unimportant;
5 = very important). 44 aldermen
Financial item Average score Average score
Revenues and funding sources 4.3 2.5 (2%)
Current expenditure by nature 3.8 1.9 (2%)
Current expenditure by destination 3.9 2.0 (2%)
Capital expenditure by nature 3.8 0.8 (1%)
Capital expenditure by destination 3.8 5.3 (4%)
Transfers from other governmental levels 3.8 1.7 (1%)
Budgetary surplus/deficit 4.0 1.1 (1%)
Accounts receivable and commitments to be paid 4.1 0 (0%)
Costs of activities 3.8 0.2 (0%)
Liability 3.5 1.2 (1%)
Receivables 3.2 0 (0%)
Assets 3.4 0.1 (0%)
Depreciation 3.1 0 (0%)
*This study also investigated the importance politicians attached to non-financial information and managers’
appreciation of the same set of financial and non-financial items (not presented here).
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study about improved budgetary information
for politicians in a Dutch province (ter Bogt et al.,
2015). Here, a new performance budget was
found to be highly appreciated, but its actual use
was minimal. Research about the actual use of
financial information by politicians is scarce.
Noteworthy is a study by Ezzamel et al. (2008)
about accounting innovations resulting from
devolvement projects in the UK, especially the
findings of Hyndman about the limited use of
accrual accounting information by politicians in
the NI Assembly, which are based on case/field
research. In addition, Yamamoto’s (2008) survey
study about Japanese government showed a
limited use of financial information at the central
level, while at the local level use was higher. Case/
field research, which mostly relies on interviews
and documentary studies, enables indepth
investigations about the way in which accounting
documents are used. However, observations of
actual behaviour are often lacking, which possibly
places case/field research between surveys and
observational studies in accurately depicting
politicians’ accounting information use.
Performance information use
For the purposes of this essay, two important
studies about politicians’ use of performance
information are examined in depth: ter Bogt
(2004) and Askim (2007).
Ter Bogt (2004) conducted a survey among
aldermen in larger Dutch municipalities about
their performance information use. He found
that informal, verbal contacts, as well as formal
meetings and contacts with top managers, were
the relatively mostly used sources of information
(see also Daft and Lengel, 1990; ter Bogt, 2001).
Relatively less important, but still useful to some
degree, were budgetary and interim reports. In
addition, the aldermen were critical about the
quality of the performance information in the
budgetary documents, and did not make much
use of it. There were also some differences in the
use of the performance information dependent
upon the aldermen’s portfolios. In general, ter
Bogt suggests that aldermen perceive
performance information as less important than
other information sources.
Contrary to ter Bogt, Askim (2007), who
investigated the importance of performance
information to local government councillors in
Norway, presents more ‘positive’ findings.
Askim’s study observes high levels of performance
information utilization, although it varies across
policy fields. Askim measures performance
information using a relative approach, i.e. relative
to other sources of information, such as party
programmes and information of the
administration about specific cases. As in ter
Bogt’s study, the evidence is based on a survey.
Why are these findings between a Dutch and
a Norwegian study so different? The most likely
explanation for the observed differences may
relate to the way the studies have framed the
performance information. Ter Bogt compares it
with verbal informal information, while Askim
makes a comparison with other sources, such as
party programmes, national benchmarks and
surveys on user satisfaction. In my opinion, the
differences in findings can be explained by the
ways in which the interpretations are framed. To
put it differently, the more attractive alternative
options are, the less attractive the core option is.
Moreover, Askim is positive about a 70% score on
the usefulness of the information and a 43%
score on its use, whereas ter Bogt is negative, or
at least critical, about an average score around
2.5 on a scale between 1 and 5 on information
use. However, what a suitable reference point is
for assessing whether a certain type of information
is useful or used, is contestable, and has to be
justified. Table 2 summarises the differences
between the two studies. Obvious conclusions
are:
•Usefulness is likely to be higher than actual use.
•Findings about the usefulness and use of
performance information depend on: the
types of alternative information sources; and
the appropriate point of reference, i.e. the
boundary between ‘good’ and ‘bad’.
Performance information use is a more
popular research theme than financial
information use. In general, survey-based studies
that assess politicians’ appreciation of
performance information present ‘positive’
findings (Brun and Siegel, 2006; Ho, 2006).
Field case studies about politicians’ actual use of
performance information have indicated,
however, that this is minimal, or even absent
(Bourdeaux, 2008; Raudla, 2012; Grossi et al.,
2016). These findings seem to support the
conclusion about the papers analysed in this
section and the previous one. In addition, there
are two multi-method studies which combine
observations with a survey, one by Johnson and
Talbot (2007) and one by ter Bogt et al. (2015).
The first study points to an overall low use, while
the second corroborates my earlier conclusion
that appreciation measured by a survey can be
high, whereas actual use—measured through
observations—is low. Other survey studies about
performance information use have reported
diverging findings (Stalebrink and Frisco, 2011;
Saliterer and Korac, 2013).
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How to conceptualize politicians’ use of
accounting information?
Figure 1 is an attempt to conceptualize politicians’
use of accounting information. It distinguishes
between information usefulness and information
use. Information usefulness is assumed to be
driven by user needs which, in turn, are
determined by such issues as problems to be
solved and challenges to be coped with. Studies
about the usefulness and use of accounting
information are mostly based on accounting
documents: performance budgets or income
statements. These documents are impacted by
legislation or fashion, for example moving from
cash to accrual accounting, or making financial
documents more performance-oriented.
Figure 1 focuses on the demand side for
accounting information. There are also
conceptualizations of financial or performance
information which distinguish between the
demand for and supply of this type of information
(for example Van Dooren, 2005, p. 366).
Much of the available research concentrates
on the use and usefulness of regular accounting
documents, such as budgets, interim reports and
annual accounts. Important decisions, however,
are often based on more specific policy documents
which include both financial and other
information. Examples are policy notes on budget
cuts or a policy-making re-orientation regarding
a policy field, such as education, culture or the
environment. This implies that rather than purely
focussing on accounting documents, researchers
should increase their understanding of how
politicians arrive at decisions, and what
information is required for making these
decisions (see also Wilson, 2006; Demaj and
Summermatter, 2012).
The way forward for research
Accounting for decision-making
My main suggestion is that rather than
concentrating on politicians’ potential use of
regular accounting documents (budgets, financial
statements and performance reports), future
research should focus on the information
requirements of the decision-making process, including
agenda-setting and problem-solving. Agenda-setting
includes politicians’ actions to bring a new theme
to the attention of their fellow politicians, such as
combating race discrimination. Problems have
to be understood in a broad sense. If a problem
is well defined, for example as a choice among
several investment options based on clearly-
defined criteria, accounting information can
support choosing the best option. However,
problems are often not well structured, for
instance when they involve sentiments of
discomfort regarding potential overspending,
in the case of a particular investment project (for
example a new museum), without clear, justifiable
explanations for the overspending. Other
examples are plans for future projects which are
surrounded by uncertainties, such as one
country’s programmes for reducing air pollution
while the policies of neighbouring countries are
unclear. It is never absolutely clear in advance
which accounting information will be helpful;
politicians have to determine what they want to
know and what information is available. Only
then can the information be helpful in framing
relatively complex problems (including
politically-biased accounting information use for
the pursuit of influence and power: see, for
example, Johnsen, 2005, and Johnson and
Talbot, 2007). A third category of problems does
not relate to decision-making for the purpose of
Table 2. A comparison of performance information appreciation and use between Dutch
and Norwegian local government politicians.
Research study ter Bogt (2004) Askim (2007)
Country The Netherlands Norway
Respondents Aldermen Councillors
Method Survey Survey
Measurement Use of performance information Importance and use of
in budgets (5 point scale: performance information (%)
1 = very little/none…
5 = very often). 44 aldermen
Information item Average score Average score
Performance information Use: 2.7 Importance: Use: 43%
around 70%
Examples of more important Informal, verbal contacts with top Party programmes
sources of information managers Case documents published by the
Formal meetings with top managers administration
Examples of less important None National benchmarks
sources of information Surveys about user satisfaction
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problem-solving, but is directly associated with
issues for which politicians are accountable. In
these cases, legitimation is the main purpose, for
example in a financial scandal (for instance ‘Who
is to blame for these useless IT investments?’).
Many of the above-mentioned categories of
problems and related examples do not refer to
the regular accounting documents, such as annual
budgets or quarterly performance reports. This
finding resonates with Demaj and
Summermatter’s observation (2012, p. 103) that
it is the extreme cases, rather than the average
cases, that best reveal how and why information
is needed and used.
What methods are most appropriate for this
research? My literature review suggests
conducting observational studies in combination with
semi-structured interviews are to be preferred over
questionnaire-based research. The latter, i.e.
survey studies, over-simplify the complexity of
the information-seeking behaviour of politicians,
and are generally inclined to overestimate the
actual use of the accounting information. In
addition, academic researchers are encouraged
to conduct more interventionist studies. This
research is primarily initiated by the problems of
practitioners, for example politicians, while its
goal is twofold. First, in addition to focusing on
understanding how and why politicians approach
certain problems, it is also designed to contribute
to solving those issues. Second, it links research
findings to a broader spectrum of academic
knowledge-building. Further, as public sector
accounting researchers, we should stop using an
accounting-based vocabulary. We need to talk to
politicians in a language that they understand.
Several branches of theories are potentially
suitable for approaching this theme. There are
currently two dominant ones in public sector
performance management research. The first is
contingency-based research, which starts from
the view that performance management practices
depend upon certain contextual circumstances,
such as the complexity of processes or
environmental uncertainty (see, for example,
Cavalluzzo and Ittner, 2004; Van Dooren, 2005;
Moynihan and Pandey, 2010; Speklé and
Verbeeten, 2014; and Kroll, 2015, for a review
on the link between managerial performance
information use and organizational
performance). The second one is neo-institutional
sociology, which highlights how performance
management practices have become taken for
granted due to certain pressures, and how these
practices contribute to habitual types of actions
(see Modell, 2009, for a review). Without denying
the importance of these theories, some other
theories are suggested here because they
potentially enable an understanding of how
decision-making by politicians drives their
accounting information use. Theories should do
justice to the complexities and richness of
empirical realities, which is an implicit plea to
refrain from views that assume straightforward
causalities among abstract constructs (see also
Tummers and Karsten, 2012).
In decision-making, politicians often face
complexities, for example in choosing among
various options to solve a problem or in adopting
the proper information sources. Hence, ideas
about bounded rationality and a problem-driven search
for information, as developed more than 50 years
ago by Simon (1958) and Cyert and March
(1963), are potentially of interest. Simon argues
Figure 1. Conceptualizing politicians’ accounting information use.
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that due to constraints in their cognitive
capabilities, decision-makers mostly do not
consider all relevant options for solving their
problems, but only a limited number of
alternatives. Moreover, decision-makers
generally do not strive for the best but for what
is considered as satisfactory. Cyert and March
indicate that people in organizations search for
that particular information which pertains to the
problems they are faced with. Furthermore, in
seeking information, they draw upon their past
experiences. This view is in line with ideas about
how decision-makers can cope with information
overload (Edmunds and Morris, 2000; see Jansen,
2008, p. 11, for a public sector illustration). What
are the implications of these theoretical viewpoints
for accounting information use? If a problem
arises, the available sources of information might
be the first things to consider. These can include
a budget, a performance report, or some part of
the annual accounts; in general, accounting
information which forms part of the planning
and control cycle. Often, however, this type of
information is regarded as insufficient because it
lacks necessary detail for obtaining an appropriate
insight into the problem at hand. This situation
often leads to a desire for more, and especially
more detailed information. What happens next
is dependent upon how the various actors—
members of the executive and delegates from
the different parties (the coalition and the
opposition)—deal with this information in
positioning themselves in the debate. If the actors
are satisfied with the ‘solution’ to the problem, or
if they feel that, despite their dissatisfaction with
it, there is no room for further ‘improvement’,
they have to accept the new status quo, at least for
the time being. However, the actors’ decisions
also depend on what other actors do and say. It
is this dynamic interplay between the various
actors and the information sources they desire to
adopt that shapes the processes of decision-
making and information use (see also Askim,
2009). Actor-network theory (ANT) can also be
considered for investigating this dynamic
interplay (see Christensen and Skærbæk, 2007,
for a public sector accounting study based on
ANT).
When politicians use information for
addressing or solving problems, their
effectiveness in convincing other actors primarily
depends on the way in which they present their
arguments. Politicians’ main asset is speech, rather
than reading or writing. This is why the rhetorical
theory of diffusion could be helpful in
understanding how politicians mobilize their
information in debates. According to Green
(2004), this theory highlights the causal potency
of language in shaping organizational life and
behaviour. Rhetorical theory portrays managers
(or politicians) as ‘rhetors’ and suggests that their
most influential tool is language. In speech,
various types of arguments can be used, ranging
from emotional (such as ‘fear about the
unknown’), rational (where efficiency and
effectiveness reasoning is at stake), to claims of
moral legitimacy (for example impartiality,
integrity). The relevance of each type of
argumentation may change with the stage of the
policy-making lifecycle (pathos may initiate
change, logos may implement it, and ethos may
sustain it). Financially-oriented argumentation
is often assumed to be linked to rational forms of
reasoning, whereas emotional pleas (for example
about the loss of autonomy if draconic measures
for solving financial deficit problems are
disregarded), as well as moral standpoints (such
as being accountable towards creditors or future
generations) can also be relevant.
The role of financial specialists
A second future research theme concerns the
role of financial specialists in party delegations.
Here Hyndman (in Ezzamel et al., 2008) makes
a distinction between ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’
politicians, referring to differences in financial
expertise. In his studies about the use of resource-
based accounting and budgeting (RAB) in the
NI Assembly, insiders, such as members of the
budget committee, have a reasonably good
understanding of financial figures. Outsiders,
usually members of other parliamentary
committees, do not have any knowledge about
and interest in financial affairs. Future research
could focus on how insiders share their knowledge
of financial issues with outsiders.
Various roles of financial specialists in party
delegations are thinkable, for example, a
supportive role towards non-financial
colleagues, or a watchdog role which emphasizes
financial prudence and countervailing action
to ‘unnecessary’ spending initiatives.
The information exchange among different
types of politicians cannot be easily unravelled
using surveys or interview-based case studies. In
order to assess what is really going on in this
process, a non-participant observational approach is
desirable. This approach could include both
formal and informal party delegation meetings,
thereby reaching behind the scenes of the official
council or parliamentary committee meetings.
Moreover, a longitudinal approach seems
appropriate because deliberation processes
regarding politically relevant problems, which
require financial information, evolve over time.
A promising theoretical avenue would be role
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theory, in which expectations about roles—for
example the expectations of party delegates about
the role of financial specialists—can be compared
with the actual behaviour (in this case, that of the
financial specialists). This theory can also include
organizational and personal characteristics that
shape possible conflicts between expected and
actual roles. The research by Liguori et al. (2009)
about the interconnected roles of politicians and
managers, as well as Roussy’s (2013) study on
roles of internal auditors in the public sector, are
fertile sources of inspiration in this context.
Challenges
My suggested research agenda is challenging
but risky. In comparison with surveys, case-
based research, including observations, is a less
structured and therefore more complicated
method for studying political accounting
information use for decision-making. Getting
results published via this approach may therefore
take longer and might be difficult. However,
gaining meaningful academic knowledge and
conducting practice-relevant research should
remain the principal motivators of scholars.
Implications for practice
At this stage it is not easy to formulate implications
for how politicians should or can use accounting
information. This essay shows why we need for
indepth investigations into the role of accounting
information in political agenda-setting and
problem-solving. Nevertheless, some tentative
pointers for practice can be given. As Pollitt
(2006, p. 49) has already indicated, performance
reports, or more generally accounting
documents, are available and will be picked up
especially in those cases where something seems
to have gone wrong. Two implications for practice
are suggested.
First, standard accounting documents, such
as budgets and interim reports, are not likely to
be used systematically by politicians, unless there
are institutionalized arrangements for doing so.
This can be the case when a budget committee of
the legislative employs formalized procedures
requiring a systematic analysis of budgetary
documents, or when the legislative is supported
by intermediaries, which have the obligation to
enrich the regular accounting documents for
use by politicians. These institutionalized
arrangements are perhaps only feasible in larger
administrations. Smaller ones are dependent
upon the coincidental expertise and interests of
individual members of the legislative. If
institutional arrangements for using standard
accounting documents are in place, a rational
type of use is likely. Examples are cost-benefit
analyses of programmes or projects, or corrective
actions based on a comparison between planned
and actual figures. Evidently, certain accounting
traditions, which can diverge among countries,
can have an impact on the use of the regular
accounting documents.
Second, when politicians have to participate
in debates about controversial projects or
programmes, accounting information is likely to
be used intensively at the various stages of the
decision-making process. Future research has to
reveal which contextual circumstances contribute
to certain types of use by the various players. For
controversial programmes or projects, a rational
type of use seems unlikely. We have to accept
that, in such circumstances, politicians may be
inclined to use accounting information to
accommodate their political preferences.
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needed, or enabled by standard procedures for scrutinizing accounting documents.
